Over at What's Wrong with the World,
I pointed out that under the right circumstances, the
Just War Theory criteria used to condemn Scott Roeder could actually justify violence against providers of partial birth abortions. Part of the discussion comes down to whether or not you take a Roman Catholic or Reformed view of the intersection between human law and sin, and one's level of obedience to human law, but these are some of the criteria that rightly used to condemn Roeder's act as vigilantism:
- The lack of temporal proximity to the act of taking an innocent life.
- There was no attempt on Roeder's part to seek a non-violent resolution.
- Roeder used the maximum level of force necessary to stop Tiller, not the minimal level of force needed.
If Roeder had witnessed a partial birth abortion being carried out in front of him, any use of force would have had temporal proximity to Tiller's act of making an attempt on the infant's life in utero. Therefore, on that basis he could not be a vigilante because his act occurred at the same time as the crime, and was for the purpose of preventing it from happening. In order for him to be a vigilante in this scenario, one would have to concede that the state can outlaw all uses of force (including any in self-defense, no matter how small) and then declare anyone who uses reasonable force in self-defense to be a vigilante. I don't think any reasonable person would agree that the state has that level of authority.
If Roeder had then, in this alternate scenario, approached Tiller with a gun and
threatened to harm him if he didn't cease, but did not immediately harm him, then he would have met the second criterion. Roeder's next act would have to involve shooting to wound Tiller, rather than harming him in order to meet the final criterion which is the minimal use of force necessary to stop a violent act on an innocent life.
The two critical points that were made against this were that the chance for successfully saving the unborn child's life is low given the mother's complicit role in the act, and that it is illegal to enter an abortion clinic armed with the intent of stopping the act. I would counter that in this scenario, the intervening party need not give the mother any more regard than the doctor. In fact, it would, according to the Just War Theory arguments used against the act, be ironic since the mother is the actual unjust aggressor, and the doctor is nothing more than a mercenary in her employment. The second issue is where I said that the divide between traditional Protestants and Catholics becomes apparent, with the former regarding disobedience to a law used to hide violent crimes as no vice, and the latter having some sympathy for the need to obey it.
The reason I use this scenario to illustrate what I think Martin Luther meant when he said that "reason is the devil's whore" is that reason is deterministic only with respect to the data and parameters given to it. I just logically justified a scenario in which killing Tiller
could have been morally licit according to Christian theology. Another might disagree, and arrive at equally valid conclusions by taking the same underlying logic and supplying different parameters based on their own perspective. For example, even the relationship between obedience to human law, sin and salvation can skew this entire discussion wildly.
Now, consider the case of Dietrich Bonhoeffer and the plot to assassinate Hitler. Reason alone does not provide a deterministic path to ascertaining the morality of assassinating Hitler. The logic that is used to determine this is dependent on the initial assumptions. For the sake of brevity, I'll compare two of the major ones: utilitarian and traditional Christian theology of most conservative Catholics and Protestants. The utilitarian side provides a safety valve in situations like this by making the good that which provides the most pleasure and prevents the most pain for the most people, "within the limits of reason." The traditional Christian theology holds that all moral truths are immutable and unconcerned with the utilitarian calculus of how they affect one's neighbor's happiness and level of pain, "within the limits of reason" (using Jesus' example of breaking the Sabbath to save a neighbor from harm, and that example also be applied to certain things like using deception to stop a violent criminal).
Under the utilitarian assumption, the logical path leads inexorably to the assassination of Hitler because his death would cause an undeniable good for the majority of Germans and political prisoners since it would have provided a chance to end a war that Germany was losing and to free the prisoners. Law and order considerations, and even Hitler's life, would be expendable since the potential good was so overwhelmingly higher than the potential bad, that it would have been a very clear decision. The objection, within the utilitarian context, would have been to raise awareness of new information which would have shifted the potential good to a position equal to, or inferior to, the potential harm, done by the act.
If one now assumes the traditional Christian theological approach, it is a strictly immoral act to kill Hitler even to save millions of lives because the Christian theological path assumes that the ends do not justify the means (it is true that this is an assumption, but then the point is that people make philosophical and logical assumptions before they apply logic). Dietrich Bonhoeffer summarized the position of the moral quandary that the traditional Christian finds themselves in in such a situation:
"the ultimate question for a responsible man to ask is not how he is to extricate himself heroically from the affair, but how the coming generation shall continue to live." He did not justify his action but accepted that he was taking guilt upon himself as he wrote "when a man takes guilt upon himself in responsibility, he imputes his guilt to himself and no one else. He answers for it... Before other men he is justified by dire necessity; before himself he is acquitted by his conscience, but before God he hopes only for grace."
From the traditional Christian view, the act itself is still logically a criminal act because the ends do not justify the means. Whatever Hitler is doing does not justify a preemptive use of force to stop him, and from this perspective, Bonhoeffer had to make a personal choice: accept the logical conclusion that killing Hitler would be murder from his philosophical-logical path and stand aside, or do what his philosophical-logical path told him was murder, and accept whatever consequences came with it.
The conundrum that exists here between the utilitarian and the traditional Christian is that according to the logical path most consistent with both, at the time of the plot on Hitler's life, the actions were justified. For the utilitarian, Hitler's death was justified. For the traditional Christian, allowing Hitler to live was equally justified, and killing him, highly problematic. Now obviously, both of them would have preferred to be free of a murderous tyrant, but one cannot confuse the desirability of an outcome with the morality of the means to acquiring the outcome. Morality is a matter of "what should I do," not "how should I achieve this desirable outcome."
Secular moral reasoning tends to make the disastrous mistake of finding a desirable outcome, finding an an efficient path to it, and then assuming that logic and reason naturally dictate that that is the natural course of logical thinking. Another mistake that secular moral reasoning often makes is not accounting for the fact that the "desirable outcome" is often deeply rooted in emotional and subconscious desires which have little to do with pure logic. For example, there are people for whom liberty is the
sine qua non of life, and there are those who for whom peace and order are the
sine quibus non of life. Both of those desires are rooted in emotional, pre-rational human behavior. Logic does not dictate either of them.
At their most fundamental, the rules of logic, and by extension, human reason, are just algorithms. Like most algorithms, the result is dependent on the inputs. The inputs need not just be data, but rather can also include entire rule sets, whether done so consciously or subconsciously (usually the case). For these reasons, and more, it is important for people to realize the limits of logic and reason as the exclusive basis for moral philosophy.
The Enlightenment model of reason as the basis of morality and guiding light for humanity is fundamentally flawed in that it assumes that humans are essentially rational by nature, rather than emotional and rationalizing. A significant percentage of the body of economics and political ideas rests on this dangerous foundation because it assumes that man is a rational being who acts in his rational self-interest in relating to the world. Likewise, much of modern philosophy outright ignores the overriding influence that emotion and animal instinct have on the way that human beings utilize reason.